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ARGUMENT

THE MOTION IN LIMINE GRANTED BY THE COURT IMPEDED THE COURTS
DETERMINATION OF THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST
The visitation rights of Defendant-Appellant, Scott Smith, have
been thwarted and interfered with from the date of the Decree of Divorce
to the present.

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Patricia

Taylor, has made

continuous attempts to sever the minor child Jesse's relationship with
his father.

For 37 months Scott was unaware of Jessefs specific

whereabouts, and was unable to locate him until he was informed that
Patricia was in Arizona and was attempting to terminate Scott's parental
rights on the grounds of abandonment.

It was Patricia's intention to

have her present husband adopt Jesse.

After finally locating his son

sott filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in 1984 to more
pecifically outline his rights to visitation, and to hold Patricia in
Dntempt for her interference with his parental rights.
Scott sought modification of the decree so that he could enjoy a
Dre consistent

relationship

with

his

son.

But

even

after

the

Ddification Scott has not enjoyed the full benefits of his parentlild relationship with Jesse.

Due to the ongoing difficulties Scott

qoeriences with exercising visitation and the disruption

and ill

rfects the interference has on his son, Scott filed a petition to
)dify requesting a change of custody in 1988.

Scott attempted to

resent evidence concerning his continuing difficulties with exercising
.s visitation but the Court only allowed evidence subsequent to the
•84 modification when it granted the Motion in Limine.
Scott realized the importance of fostering a genuine relationship
.th his son and attempted to do so by seeking a modification of his
.sitation rights.

Scott was aware of the high-threshold he would have

* meet in seeking a change of custody and attempted to utilize other
tans.

But his attempt was in vain.

Patricia has not adhered to the

>urtfs order and she has failed to purge herself of contempt.

By

plying the doctrine of res judicata to the present matter, the motion
limine granted by the Court is only penalizing

Scott

for not

itially seeking custody of Jesse and is circumventing equity.
The case law in Utah is well established with regards to modifying
stody.

The two step requirement outlined in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P. 2d 51
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(Utah 1982), is the applicable standard:
In the initial step, the court will receive
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of
any changes in those circumstances upon which the
earlier award of custody was based. In this step,
the party seeking modification must demonstrate (1)
that since the time of the previous decree, there
have been changes in the circumstances upon which
the previous award was based, and (2) that those
changes are sufficiently substantial and material
to justify reopening the question of custody.
In order to open the question of custody, the first step in the Hogge
test must be met, and because of the motion in limine, Scott was never
allowed the opportunity to present the entirety of his case to the
Court.

As stated in step (1) , the Court is to receive evidence of

changes and circumstances back to the previous award of custody to
determine if there is a material change of circumstances.

In the

present matter,the only time custody was an issue was in the initial
Decree of Divorce. Judge Harding held that defendant-appellant had not
shown that a substantial and material change in circumstances had
occurred. However, the court improperly granted plaintiff-respondent's
Motion in Limine, which meant that the Court did not consider much of
the evidence pertaining to a change of circumstances.
Plaintiff-respondent argues that the theory of res judicata should
bar any evidence prior to the 1984 hearing which found Patricia Smith
in contempt and modified visitation. Defendant-appellant understood the
dangers of trying to change custody, and the potential effects on Jesse.
He also understood the difficulty in meeting the threshold in showing
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substantial and material change of circumstances.

Mr. Smith did not

eek a custody change, but rather to enforce his visitation rights as
he child's father.

It is unconscionable as well as

inequitable for

he court to determine that Mr. Smith should have attempted to change
ustody in 1984 and that since he did not, he is barred from introducing
vidence during that time, which has continued to the present.

By

ranting the Motion in Limine, the court refused to consider evidence
f numerous address changes in an attempt to conceal the child and
estroy the father-son relationship, which culminated in an attempt by
laintiff-respondent

to have defendant-appellant's

parental

rights

erminated because of abandonment, and then to have her present husband
iopt Jesse. During this period, the court had ordered Mr. Smith to pay
lild support into a trust account since the whereabouts of plaintiffsspondent and the child were unknown.

In the following cases, the

Durts changed custody for similar reasons.

Gitnter v. Gunter, 418 N.E.2d

19, 93 Ill.App.3d 1043 (1981); Daghir v. Daghir, 441 N.Y.S. 2d 494, 82
.D.2d 191 (1981); Munford v. Shaw, 444 N.Y.S.2d 138. 94 A.D.2d (1981).
The fact that Patricia has still not purged herself of contempt
irther enforces the need for the Court to review her past history and
ir ongoing attempts to restrict visitation as is connected with a
xstody dispute.

The ongoing actions of Patricia affect Jesse and his

>ed for a relationship with his parents. Although the parties in this
itter are no longer married, a family unit still exists in the mind of
isse and the continued relationship with both parents is of major
4

concern. The persistent difficulties and the past history of Patricia's
conduct are all relevant and need to be considered by the Court.
Plaintiff-respondent also argues that her conduct prior to the 1984
hearing has no bearing to the immediate fact situation, and that it
hasn't affected the custodial parent-child relationship.

By reviewing

Patricia's behavior from the time of the divorce to the present, a
history of contempt and attempts to frustrate and destroy visitation and
relationships are established.
The argument that Patricia's behavior in restricting visitation
among other things, has not affected her relationship with Jesse is best
addressed by the New York Court in Daghir v. Daghir, supra, when it held:
To be meaningful, however, visitation must be
frequent and regular. Only then may a noncustodial
parent provide his child with the guidance and
counsel youngsters require in their formative
years. Only then may he be an available source of
comfort and solace in times of his child's need.
Only then may he share in the joy of watching his
offspring grow to maturity and adulthood.
Indeed, so jealously do the courts guard the
relationship between a noncustodial parent and his
child that any interference with it by the
custodial parent has been said to be an act so
inconsistent with the best interests of the
children as to, per se, raise a strong probability
that the offending party is unfit to act as
custodial parent.
CONCLUSION
The Court's granting of the motion in limine has only worked to
defeat the ends of justice.
custodial

interference

with

In the instant case the ongoing battle of
visitation
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directly

effects

the

best

iterests of the child. Only by having the entire history of Patricia's
sntemptuous behavior can the Court make a determination of whether a
lange of circumstances has occurred sufficient to consider Jesse's best
iterests.

The effects of Patricia's continued attempts to thwart and

image the parent-child relationship of Scott and Jesse is a matter that
>eds to be heard in its entirety.
The history of Patricia's conduct has a direct reflection and
taring on the immediate fact situation and has bearing on the best
iterests of Jesse Smith.

Defendant-Appellant, Scott Smith, prays this

Durt hold that the District Court abused its discretion in granting a
)tion in limine and that this court find that a change of circumstances
is occurred and that it is in the child's best interest that custody
i awarded to defendant-appellant, or in the alternative, that the trial
Durt be reversed and the matter remanded with directions that evidence
* heard since the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

day of January, 1990.

THOMAS A. SCRIBNSR for
WATSON; SCRIBNER & BURROWS
^Attorneyy for Defendant-Appellant
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